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18 November 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: SNIE 31/1-57: Yugoslavia's International Position

1. This estimate was requested by the Department of State for completion no later than 19 November.

2. The chief substantive issue is whether Belgrade is likely to move any closer than it already has toward alignment with the Bloc. The majority view is that so long as Tito does not change his favorable estimate of Soviet policy, Yugoslavia will continue to draw closer. We agree that Tito will not go so far as to compromise his independence, and that many developments could interrupt the trend toward rapprochement (Belgrade already seems to be taking a second look as a result of Zhukov's ouster). However, we believe that Tito now sees the greatest possibilities for expanding his influence and ensuring his security in encouraging favorable trends in Moscow's policy, rather than in maintaining a "middle position."

3. State and Defense prefer to say only that Tito "may" move closer to the Bloc (paras. A and 36). They place much greater emphasis on US leverage (through cutting aid, etc.) to forestall a closer alignment. The Board grants that the US retains some

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leverages but only enough to cause Tito to limit the extent of his
alignment, not enough to cause him to alter his present course.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:

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